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Poetic Musicology among Musical Discourses: 
The Poet as a Listener
1
“Some people like poetry,” wrote Wisława Szymborska (Szymborska: 325). 
The same can be said about music. But do these ‘some people’ who like music 
like poetry, too? And vice versa, do poetry lovers like music?
As we know, the relationship between musicological discourse and liter-
ature-specialist discourse can be a complex, even contentious, one. Now and 
again, this dispute is eased due to various concepts corresponding to the spirit 
of the times and the specific qualities of the artistic material – the idea of the 
correspondence of the arts, intersemiotic, interdisciplinary or intermedia re-
search, or performative, communicative, cognitivist or rhetoric approaches (to 
name but a few). However, there is no denying that this dispute is genetic and 
derives from the very essence of SPEAKING about music. The special place 
occupied by literature results from the fact that the reception and interpretation 
of most artistic activities is brought to its own territory – the territory of the 
word. Like the visual arts, music’s non-verbal nature means that it is usually 
transcribed; this is clearly denoted by the fact that musicology as a science uses 
the written word rather than sound.
Of course, it is possible to comment on music through music. This pos-
sibility was signalled, among others, by George Steiner, who added that such 
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interpretations are the best ones. Steiner illustrated this thesis with an anecdote 
about Schumann, who, when asked to clarify a difficult etude, only played 
it once more; he also quoted the example of Liszt, whose arrangements were 
a specific commentary on the works of others (Steiner: 20–21). Peter Szendy 
referred to this second example, too, by presenting his own theory of arrange-
ment as a strategy of immanent interpretation carried out within one semiotic 
system. But both Steiner and Szendy – and many others – made an implicit 
act of capitulation on that occasion, showing the communication limitations 
of intramusical discourse through the very fact of final reference to the word 
rather than music for the purpose of expressing their musical reflections (both 
Schumann and Liszt were the composers who liked speaking about music 
through words).
Obviously, the longing for alternative non-verbal means of musical expres-
sion recurs from time to time. In this spirit, Peter Kivy, for example, appreciates 
gesture or dance as a tool to express musical feelings (Kivy: 99–123). This, 
however, does not change a fact which even the most fervent follower of the 
thesis of the autonomy of music cannot ignore: that the basic ground for the 
exchange of reflections on music is language. In its historical origins, therefore, 
musicology was not an expression of rebellion against the hegemony of the word, 
but against its imprecision and entanglement in poeticalness. In this regard, it 
assumed a separation between verbality and literariness. The formalist revolt of 
Eduard Hanslick, which was a reaction against romantic, extremely subjective 
unbridled interpretations, resulted from a desire for the radical purification 
and autonomisation of musical discourse through a return to the somewhat 
“transparent” language of the professional “craftsman”. Although this project 
in its radical Hanslickian form has long been considered utopian, it still serves 
a purpose and is useful as a certain matrix of thinking about music in terms 
of objectivism. Such an interpretation is always associated with an attempt 
to separate the personal attitude to the work from its objective analysis and 
to depersonalise artistic comments; as Hanslick himself put it, “when getting 
drunk, do we recognise it as the same kind of wine that we wanted to examine?” 
(Hanslick: 23). Today, this argument is easily refuted with the statement that 
contact with wine is not only aimed at identifying its type. For this reason, 
when formulating his assumptions for the integral interpretation of a musical 
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work, Mieczysław Tomaszewski attached most importance to the postulate of 
“the choice of an engaged work for analysis and interpretation. A work that you 
admire, experience and learn about all at the same time. The danger of this kind 
of subjectivism in connection with a work of art seems to be no worse than the 
danger carried by so-called objectivism.” (Tomaszewski: 33).
Hanslick’s revolt was not in vain, however. Among other things, it led to 
the conscious separation of various ways of verbalising music, with particular 
emphasis on their diverse motivations. Most importantly, it resulted in the 
opening of discourses.
2
And I do not see any reason why, on condition of respecting methodological rules 
that guarantee correctness, a musicologist should not refer to the effectiveness 
of rhetoric, to the beauty of pictures or the inventiveness of metaphors, with the 
same success that a writer is able to achieve. Besides, a writer can sometimes speak 
about music as brilliantly as a musicologist does.
(Nattiez: 13)
So wrote Jean-Jacques Nattiez [my translation], proceeding from the 
ascertainment that “speaking about music has a bad press” and putting this 
situation down to its excessive specialisation and causticity. Today, musicol-
ogists generally seem to agree that, while the structure of a musical work is 
transcribable with specialist language, all other levels of its perception require 
referring to rhetorical concepts or metaphors. There are even opinions ques-
tioning the advisability of maintaining the specialist musical terminology: for 
example, Stephen Davies states that virtually all musical phenomena can be 
described with colloquial language or by using a metaphor (Davies: 150–165). 
However, the use of metaphor often arises out of necessity; while specialist 
terminology, even if regarded as unnecessary, is functional as a practical mental 
shortcut (according to the same principle that works in poetics where the use 
of “professional” terms spares descriptive explications and shortens the line of 
reasoning) in the case of musical works that can be recorded by means of the 
(more or less traditional) notation methods, it ceases to be effective with regard 
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to experimental works that employ unconventional sounds. As regards record-
ings of the reception and experience of music, the metaphor in its broad sense 
may seem particularly privileged and, in special cases, it may even be the only 
way to express them (Scruton, 1999: 2009). Irrespective of the functionality 
of the metaphor, its presence in musicology is certainly determined by this 
“respect for methodological rules that guarantee correctness” that Nattiez wrote 
about; they mark the border between the territory of musicological reflection 
and the territory explored by literary scholars that is often defined in the Polish 
humanistic tradition as poetic “musicology”.
This term was coined by Anna Barańczak; being fully aware of the dif-
ferent conditions and goals of writing about music in artistic and university 
environments, she made attempts to appreciate literary description by high-
lighting its potential for extracting meanings that academic musicologists (from 
the time when the text was written) did not want to or could not see and also 
its ability to refresh the perspective of music in spite of the numerous “errors 
and distortions” in this respect (The term “poetic” seems to be synonymous 
with “literary” in Barańczak’s text). Published at the beginning of the 1970s, 
Barańczak’s text is characterised by an approach that is, to some limited extent, 
confrontational because it forms a reaction to the hegemony of formalism pre-
vailing in thinking about music at that time. At the same time, it was one of the 
more important steps towards overcoming it and extending and diversifying the 
proofs of musical reception. This line of thought was taken up by many Polish 
researchers, including Andrzej Hejmej, who characterised the assumptions of 
poetic “musicology” as follows:
Literature transforms and displays certain musical meanings, thereby becoming 
a non-conventional commentary to music; it may be extremely subjective at one 
time or more valid at another, extremely speculative on one occasion and strictly 
musicological on another.
(Hejmej: 242 [trans. I.P.])
In such an interpretation, poetic “musicology” constitutes a formula that 
validates a literary commentary in its entire unconventionality. However, if we 
approach the topic historically and panoramically, it will turn out that literary 
opinions on music clearly dominate over objectivising musicological commen-
tary both in terms of quantity and the scope of impact. For this reason, they 
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have exerted a much stronger impact on the reception of the art of sounds than 
specialist opinions, marking the awareness of recipients and, consequently, the 
culture of musical reception with various variants of its “non-conventionality”. 
Besides, many earlier classic musicological works are far from neutral and contain 
many “extremely subjective” or “extremely speculative” elements. In the last 
few decades, as a result of the strong split of the paradigm of scholarship in the 
humanities and the suspension of the question about the objective “truth” of 
works of art, various ways of interpreting music have begun to multiply also 
within the scope of university musicology and the category of “typicality” has 
become visibly blurred, even though the dominance of formal analysis (which, 
I presume, constitutes those “strictly musicological” parts of literary speaking 
about literature mentioned by Hejmej) undoubtedly continues to distinguish 
the musicological interpretation from other ways of speaking about the art of 
sounds.
For this reason, while taking over the useful term of poetic “musicology” 
from Anna Barańczak, I will allow myself to modify it slightly (signalled by the 
use of inverted commas for both words, not just the second one) because, whilst 
acknowledging the correctness of the researcher’s view of the literary description 
of music, I perceive its function in the evolution of the cultural universum in 
a different manner. Namely, I do not treat poetic messages and musicological 
commentaries as two different, and to some extent competing, methods of 
reaching a certain “truth” about music, but as diverse ways of having contact 
with the art of sounds, which sometimes cross or overlap.
3
The issue of the method of receiving music according to pre-determined as-
sumptions and needs is only one side of the coin; the other side is represented 
by those qualities of music which mean it cannot be regarded as a passive phe-
nomenon, but as a thing that has the specific identity of a different performative 
nature (which Roman Ingarden tried to neutralise with such determination in 
the past) and, consequently, diversified ontology. This is because some com-
positions (e.g., sonoristic ones) essentially come into being outside – or rather 
over – the score, and some even cannot be recorded in the score (e.g., concrete 
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music works), whereas others are characterised by the precision of the notation 
or even dialogicality in cases when the score contains inscriptions that can be 
noticed only on the level of reading and not listening (such as the encryption 
of proper names or words with sounds designated by letters). The use of one 
method of analysis based on invariable assumptions towards such diversified 
material is not only simplifying, but it is virtually impossible in many cases. 
Essentially, however, all musical compositions are characterised by the fact that 
they are intended to be listened to. The fact that music fully exists only when it 
is being performed is a commonly recognised truth today; the ultimate argument 
for this was the intensive development of phonography, which ensures the du-
rability of an artefact for the previously ephemeral nature of sound engineering. 
It is also important that this artefact is no longer considered in relation to the 
score in the logic of identity, but that its translation or adaptation is close to the 
interpretation of Wittgenstein, who used the picture of a phonograph record 
as an example of the logic of mapping (4.014–4.0141).
As a consequence of the possibility of recording sound, the strategies of 
musical description evolved substantially, and the front line dividing the work 
from its sonic modification was moved. Today, it is no longer situated between 
the permanent record of a score transcribable by musicological nomenclature 
and the variable form of “concretisation” – it has a more fluid character and is 
increasingly often expressed in the question about conditions (historical, social, 
cultural, environmental, etc.) rather than the adequacy of the specific way in 
which the work comes into being.
The clear pluralisation of positions within the scope of modern knowl-
edge about music involves another factor – an intensely developing reflection 
on listening that introduces a new quality into the sphere of musicological 
thought. This is because formal analysis is connected with analysis of the nota-
tion; detailed performance based only on listening to it is virtually impossible, 
especially in the case of harmonically complex or experimental works. In his 
famous classification of types of listening, T.W. Adorno assigned such an abil-
ity to a very small group of music recipients, whom he defined as experts and 
among whom he ranked only outstanding professional musicians (Adorno, 
1968). This kind of analysis is actually possible only with regard to the score 
as the distilled form of a musical work. Moreover, this type of description also 
67
Po e t i c  M u s i c o l o g y  am o n g  M u s i c a l  D i s c o u r s e s :  T h e  Po e t  a s  a  L i s t e n e r
means the suspension of the temporal aspect of the composition because it is 
carried out within time structures that are different from the structures of the 
passage of the musical work, being actually suspended in time. On the other 
hand, the reflection on listening situates the musical passage in relation to 
external circumstances by arranging and correlating its timing with them and 
setting it in a specific time and space (Chion, 1998: 2010).
Like many expressions in the human sciences, the auditive breakthrough 
and the validation of the subjective approach to music assumes various degrees 
– from moderate degrees that integrate a new perspective of seeing with other 
people to other, more extreme degrees. One of the most radical representatives 
of the auditive approach to music is Antoine Hennion, who suggests that it 
should be regarded as an “uncertain result dependent on what the listener 
will do with it, not a certainty” (Hennion: 95 [trans. I.P.]) – in this way, orig-
inating from sociological positions, it assumes a neo-pragmatic position that 
is analogous to the position of Richard Rorty and others within the scope of 
philosophical thought. Focusing in particular on the meanders of the forma-
tion of musical tastes, or – more generally – aesthetic preferences and habits, 
Hennion presents the idea of a new analysis of reception where, as he states, 
music is not the point of departure, but the point of arrival (Hennion: 96). 
Expressing his opinion on the open form of each musical work, he energetically 
fights against all symptoms of what he calls the “graphomorphisation” of music 
related to primacy of the score. Engaging in practical research in the form of 
seminars and workshops, he focuses on working with amateurs of music and 
actually removes from his field of vision the phenomenon of reception marked 
by musicological knowledge, thereby trying to grasp the specific qualities of 
culturally and educationally unformatted acts of listening, with the sensitivity 
of the recipients as the only intermediate factor.
Hennion’s theses are a good illustration of how far the modern sociology of 
music can depart from the objectivising approach to a musical work. However, 
irrespective of whether we are inclined to agree with his assumptions or not, they 
are certainly not functional enough when it comes to examining the evidence of 
reception not controlled by the assumptions of a listening experiment – spon-
taneous but not necessarily amateurish evidence in the form of poems. More 
useful, though also under certain conditions, is the approach proposed by Peter 
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Szendy, one of the most active musicologists with philosophical tendencies in 
the field of aculogy, particularly his idea of appropriation as a receptive attitude 
that is elementary and necessary for the sake of authentic contact with music. 
Presenting an analytical rather than experimental approach, Szendy is inter-
ested mainly in individual acts of listening, particularly when they assume the 
form of a specific intramusical dialogue – the expression of reception through 
transcription or arrangement. But not only – he attaches equal importance to 
verbal records of listening, whether of an artistic, documentary or private nature.
Although Szendy’s considerations focus on issues customarily connected 
with the semantic field of the word “interpretation”, he avoids this concept, 
which seems to be too wide and methodologically too complicated for his 
conception – for example, it is excessively burdened with the hermeneutical 
tradition (Szendy: 15). Most importantly, it implies the existence of a stable 
paradigm of a musical work, which the researcher questions, making an attempt 
to “consider the concept of a musical work” (interroger la notion d’oeuvre) in 
strict connection with the categories of its rights and ownership; as he states, 
“Interpretation is also a form of appropriation of music […]. But I think that 
interpretation as such rarely asks a question about the work as such” (Szendy: 
25 [trans. I.P.]).
Thus, departing from thinking about music in terms of interpretation, 
Szendy replaces this concept with the term “listening”, which encompasses the 
method of having contact with a work that is ascribed not only to the passive 
(traditional) listener, but also to the performer and the composer. It is important 
to note that his concept of “listening” includes also having contact with music 
only by means of the score, not through performance (Szendy: 22).
As we can see, the idea of interpretation is virtually absent in Szendy’s 
conception – there are various methods of listening; the perspective he adopts 
equals not only the performer’s and the recipient’s instances, but also the creative 
instance, and the various effects of “listening” are defined by the common term 
of arrangement, synonyms of which include concepts such as adaptation and 
transcription (Szendy: 22). Szendy also treats arrangement in its musical sense 
as an attempt to tell others about our own individual reception – an attempt 
to draw other people’s attention to how we listen to a given work on our own 
and what we hear in it (Szendy: 53–88).
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Understood in both a strict musical sense and also in a broader meta-
phorical sense, arrangement is the expression of the privatisation of a work; 
here Szendy agrees with Adorno, but he evaluates this process in a completely 
different way. His conception of listening, although not as radical as Hennion’s, 
also assumes alienation: in his view, a musical work has a spectral character 
by nature – it exists as the sum of listening acts and their evidence, not as 
an objective value. In this conception, the score is also only a shadow of the 
work (although Szendy admits that he definitely prefers working with scores 
to working with sound materials) – the same goes for music which exists only 
in the form of sound and which is devoid of notation (e.g, electroacoustic or 
electronic music), which is apparently more stable in ontological terms, but in 
fact it is also modified every time by the sonic environment and the context 
in which it exists.
This redefinition, or actually reversal, of traditional concepts has the 
features of a conceptual- linguistic game, but it is based on a significant ob-
servation that may not be absolutely new, but is presented suggestively: the 
thought about the absolute autonomy of a musical work and, at the same time, 
about its consternating dependence as an open work par excellence. Therefore, 
as a consequence of that, the question about music rights in their widest sense 
arises: “Who has the right to music?… Who has the right to make it his own?... 
Who can make music be heard in the same way that he hears it?” asks Szendy 
(21–23 [trans. I.P.]).
The answer to these questions may seem both obvious and cynical: every-
one who will include it in an appropriately prominent discourse. Therefore, 
suggestive interpretations made within the scope of “poetic musicology”, irre-
spective of their verifiability and validity, have often met with better reception 
than objectivising interpretations. However, this does not mean that they can 
replace the latter. The essence of the matter actually lies not in the question 
about which verbal representations of music are “better” or more “accurate” 
or which ones will be more popular among the listeners, but how these acts 
of listening correspond to each other. In an age when the human sciences lead 
increasingly often to a confrontation of discourses and pay less and less atten-
tion to the confrontation of individual works, it seems justified to ask about 
the correspondence of methods of interpretation (or, in this case, it would be 
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more proper to say “methods of listening”) rather than arts. In music, this 
relationship seems to emerge in the most distinctive manner and has the most 
significant consequences, because the ontical form of a musical work that can 
be recorded by means of notation makes its reception an actually comparative 
activity: first the work existing in the notation is confronted with its sonic 
expression, i.e., with its “version”, its “translation” – or their multitude, their 
whole set! – and only this original act of comparing a “listening act” leads to 
the further stages of learning the musical work and expressing opinions on it. 
Further confrontations and successive placement of this work within the limits 
of various discourses, including musicological, literary, intermedia, psycholog-
ical, legal and sociological ones, are the natural consequences of this primary 
act. Only musical works existing merely in sonic form that are intranscribable 
to the notation system (such as electronic or electroacoustic music) avoid this 
original comparative confrontation. However, they fail to avoid its successive 
stages and complications.
4
Although I am far from accepting all of Szendy’s ideas, the conception of a po-
etic contextualisation of musical works fits well with both the transposition 
of the conception of an open work into the musicological field and also with 
the idea of “appropriation”. These interpretations allow us to put “scientific” 
(objectivising) elaborations and poetic expressions in a complementary rela-
tion, which in turn makes it possible to create a multi-aspect view of poetic 
statements concerning music. 
Replacing the concept of interpretation with the concept of listening is 
a step towards removing the border between “poetic musicology” and tout court 
musicology. However, I am unable to take this step – mainly because the major-
ity of poets have faith in the certain ontological stability of music, sometimes 
even in its absolute stability, and traditional musicology has a strong influence on 
their way of having contact with the art of sounds. Besides, as Szendy’s analyses 
aptly show, the specificity of one’s own personal attitude towards music can be 
discovered and shown only towards its existing image, towards its more or less 
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illusory IDENTITY, which is the condition for identification of the “work as 
such” (oeuvre comme telle).
Generally speaking, the auditive breakthrough in music culture excel-
lently corresponds with changes in the way that poets take on musical topics. 
Since poets do still write about music. Having gone through “childhood dis-
eases” – the romantic “explanation of music” and the naivety of “the time of 
adolescence” – modernistic “vagueness” after the shock of frequently arrogant 
formalism, they write about it increasingly often, more diversely and more con-
fidently – although we must admit that it does not happen everywhere. Polish 
poetry of the 19th and 20th centuries is an unusual occurrence in comparison 
to the literature of other nations when it comes to the quality and richness of 
the musical motifs. Poets writing in other languages, who still seem to be em-
barrassed by the frequently curious excesses related to the “poeticalisation” of 
the art of sounds, are relatively reluctant to take on musical topics, or they do 
so cautiously. Polish poets – representing different generations, including the 
youngest ones, and different literary schools and traditions – write extensively 
about it and often in a concrete matter-of-fact fashion. They describe what, 
when, where and how they listen. Like many of us, they listen to live music 
less and less frequently. They prefer using recordings, radio and the Internet 
for that purpose; if they go to a concert, they do not yield to the illusion of 
having “direct” contact with music. They listen to very diverse music – not 
only that which is called “classical” – and they do not hesitate to put the various 
kinds together. They listen both in concentration and dispersion. Sometimes 
deliberately, sometimes accidentally. But they listen and write about it. They 
write without complexes. That is because they often assume the position of 
amateurs in their relationship with music, meaning those who – according to 
the etymology of the word – love music, but – according to the modern usage 
of this concept – are not professionals and are not “experts” on music. They 
do not build their career on it and lack the appropriate music ability and/or 
relevant education.
The concept of the amateur has been the subject of intense reflection, 
particularly in the last few years, in connection with the revision of many beliefs 
concerning the role of music in modern society, including in particular the 
issue of valuating associated with the realities of the music market (Leveratto, 
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2000). First of all, the indulgent connotation of this term is fading. Paul Tolila, 
who had been regarded as a sort of “good savage” and was treated in a friendly 
but also patronising manner only half a century ago, noticed that the amateur, 
as a result of changes in the music market, had become a significant figure as 
a “user” and purchaser of music (Tolila: 9). This role of a “new type of listener” 
had already been forecast by Glenn Gould, who wrote:
The emergence of this mid-twentieth-century phenomenon is the greatest 
achievement of the record industry. For this listener is no longer passively an-
alytical; he is an associate whose tastes, preferences, and inclinations even now 
alter peripherally the experiences to which he gives his attention, and upon whose 
fuller participation the future of the art of music awaits.
He is also, of course, a threat, a potential usurper of power, an uninvited guest 
at the banquet of the arts, one whose presence threatens the familiar hierarchical 
setting of the musical establishment. Is it not, then, inopportune to venture that 
this participant public could emerge untutored from that servile posture with 
which it paid homage to the status structure of the concert world and, overnight, 
assume decision-making capacities which were specialists’ concerns heretofore?
(Gould: 347)
This new “history of the music amateur” would have to be based on new 
categories: not on factors of good or bad taste, but on analyses and descriptions 
of listening as a specific kind of activity, with the original assumption that it 
is not a passive, but a creative act. Thus, it would obviously not be history 
that would replace the traditional history of music, but rather something that 
complements it, both in the historical and modern perspective. In the history 
of music designed in this manner, poets’ testimonies may serve as an important 
segment.
Polish poets of the 20th century usually assume almost demonstratively 
the position of amateurs – for example, Adam Zagajewski, one of the most 
“musical” poets in Polish literature:
Piano lesson
[I’m eight years old]
Piano lesson at the neighbors’, Mr. and Mrs. J.
I’m in their apartment for the first time,
which smells different from ours (ours has no smell,
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or so I think). Everywhere carpets,
thick Persian carpets. I know that they’re Armenians,
but don’t know what that means. Armenians have carpets,
dust wanders through the air, imported
from Lvov, medieval dust.
We don’t have carpets or Middle Ages,
We don’t know who we are – maybe wanderers.
Sometimes I think we don’t exist. Only others are.
The acoustics are great in our neighbors’ apartment.
It’s quiet in this apartment. A piano stands in the room
like a lazy, tamed predator – and in it,
as its very heart, dwells music’s black ball.
Mrs. J. told me right after the first 
or second lesson that I should take up languages
since I showed no talent for music.
I show no talent for music.
I should take up languages instead.
Music will always be elsewhere,
inaccessible, in someone else’s apartment.
The black ball will be hidden elsewhere,
but there may be other meetings, revelations.
I went home, hanging my head,
a little saddened, a little glad – home,
where there was no smell of Persia, only amateur paintings,
watercolors, and I thought with bitterness and pleasure
that I had only one language, only words, images,
only the world.
(Zagajewski, 2012: 16)
There is a lot of real disillusionment in this poem. But, obviously, it con-
tains much insincere humility as well. “Only the world” that comes in return 
for music is not so little, after all. It is a specific declaration of independence 
– admitting one’s failure, but without excessive regret: the ironic “only” means 
removing music from its pedestal, but without contempt. It means reconstruct-
ing one’s personal relationship with music in a similar way to building a friendly 
relationship with a person for whom love has not developed. A relaxed platonic 
relationship that is already based on other principles.
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A surprisingly similar position to Zagajewski’s was adopted by the recently 
deceased Yves Bonnefoy – one of those rare modern French poets writing about 
music and a poetry theoretician who speaks extensively about its relationship 
with the other arts. On the one hand, he says that music is impossible to un-
derstand if we do not know it on a practical level; on the other hand, this lack 
of understanding does not exclude another kind of understanding and, most 
importantly, it stimulates the imagination:
From the distance I dream of many more things; you can transfigure more from 
the distance than when relations become closer and when the real door opens. 
At the same time, I know also well that music and its history that I missed in 
various ways were actually half-open for me, which allows me to hope that 
I dreamt of them in a way that makes some sense, at least as a testimony to what 
you can imagine about it.
(Bonnefoy: 14 [trans. I.P.])
Indeed, as Bonnefoy states, the lack of musical education often leads both 
poets and ordinary listeners to assume a specific position towards the art of 
sounds, which is marked by the awareness of its distinctness and distance. But 
poets often take a step farther. Even if they have decent musical abilities, they 
assume the position of non-specialists in their works and keep a distance that 
is an identity distance: they contemplate music from the perspective of poetry 
as their own domain. They rarely limit their actions to “ordinary” listening. 
They use music for their own benefits – poetic benefits. However, they turn 
out to show solidarity towards other listeners. Scouring the world of music, 
they like to assume the position of “ordinary listeners” who have the right to 
make mistakes, to disturb the hierarchy of works, to follow only their own tastes 
and to like weaker compositions while ignoring masterpieces. They sometimes 
even present themselves as an enfant terrible among refined music fans. Thus, in 
a sense, they represent the broad audience, without which musical life would die 
out and become an infertile enclave of specialists. Acting as such representatives, 
they stand in the audience’s defence, strengthening the right to have personal 
contact with music with their poetic authority, which is independent of the 
criteria of valuation imposed by others.
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It is characteristic that two poetic texts written independently of each 
other which refer to these issues are both connected with Rachmaninoff. One 
of them was written by Adam Zagajewski:
Rachmaninov
When I listened to the Third Concerto then,
I still didn’t know that experts considered it
too conservative (I hadn’t realized yet
that art holds not only art, but also hatreds, fanatical
debates, curses worthy of religious wars),
I heard the promise of things to come,
omens of complex happiness, love, sketches
of landscapes I would later recognize,
a glimpse of purgatory, heaven, wanderings, and at last,
maybe even something like forgiveness.
As I listen now to Martha Argerich play
the Third Concerto, I marvel at her mastery,
her passion, her inspiration, while the boy
I once was labors to understand
what came to pass, and what’s gone. What lives.
(Zagajewski, 2018: 25)
This idea of Rachmaninoff as a composer whose reputation is such that 
the public declaration of a fondness for his works would be treated automati-
cally as a sign of musical inexperience by “connoisseurs” (Gołąb: 71–72) also 
appears in Julia Hartwig’s text A Warning [Ostrzeżenie]:
I remember the warning gesture of his hand: “No, no!” When the praise of 
Rachmaninoff ’s concert fell out of my mouth like a frog.
He held me back with this “No, no!” like a man falling down on a slippery road 
or sliding with incredible speed down the hill over which Telemann, Purcell, 
Pergolesi or Albinioni tower.
Did he do this to save me in the eyes of his friends, so unanimous in their high 
affections, or maybe he protected my own taste against hurting, always so reliable 
and appreciating mainly the beauty of the distance?
(Hartwig, 1992: 50 [trans. I.P.])
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In both cases, the poets speak from the perspective of people with an 
established musical culture who are already initiated into a certain valuation 
code and are aware of its nuances. But they reject this initiation in the name of 
sincerity. Hartwig associates the fear of praising Rachmaninoff with weakness, 
opportunism, snobbism and the fear of being rejected. Writing about his dislike 
for the composer, Zagajewski does not ask what its source is (apart from the 
essentially neutral category of “conservatism”), but he characterises the approach 
of “connoisseurs” with the use of words that do not put them in the best light 
(“fanaticism”, “hatred”). Both Hartwig and Zagajewski assume the position 
of recipients remaining outside (or maybe also above) aesthetic disputes, who 
maintain that their right to make unrestrained individual choices and have 
preferences is the supreme right in contact with art. However, it is worth taking 
note of the various degrees of this anti-conformism – Hartwig speaks straight-
forwardly about praising Rachmaninoff, whereas Zagajewski is more inclined 
to tone down its positive reception; he presents a liking for Rachmaninoff as 
being something that corresponds to young age and immaturity. Listening to 
his concerto in D minor is justified in his poem mainly with sentimental rea-
sons and the values of its interpretation by Argerich. The reception presented 
by Zagajewski is rather bilateral: on the one hand, he is already a refined and 
mature man marked with musical knowledge and sensitive to the subtleties of 
interpretations, and on the other hand, he wants to settle his childhood dreams.
The personal musical experience confronted with the critical attitude of 
other recipients ceases to be a private and aesthetic manner – in both texts, it 
becomes a social experience, mainly of a negative character. Music is presented 
not as a sphere of agreement and mutual joy, but as a reason for potential con-
flict, confrontation or even exclusion. It becomes entangled in unfair games of 
snobbism. The listener’s relationship with music becomes the model for their 
relationships with reality and with other people. The way we listen tells us much 
about ourselves. Also about our contacts with others.
However, in Hartwig’s and Zagajewski’s poems, the feeling of distinct-
ness and the “naivety” of the listeners is not presented as a cause for concern, 
but as an opportunity to manifest one’s own individuality. Authenticity and 
non-conventionality have long been appreciated by poets. They present this 
courage to express unusual views also with regard to the art of sounds. Therefore, 
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one’s approach to music can become an important element of self-cognition 
and a significant part of our life programme – for example, in Julia Hartwig’s 
poem Secrets [Sekrety], which can be seen as a kind of manifesto that perfectly 
fits the principles of “poetic musicology”:
Don’t we exist because of things that make us different
and the courage of being different?
Do not let others impress a stamp on you
Listen to music separately – they play it for you
and pray separately if you can.
(Hartwig, 2011; 22 [trans. I.P.])
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Poetic Musicology among Musical Discourses: The Poet as a Listener 
Summary
This paper analyses selected examples of Polish poetry from the 20th century devoted 
to music (poems by Adam Zagajewski and Julia Hartwig), placing them in the context 
of the musicological discourses that exist today, particularly the auditive discourse. 
Poems devoted to music are treated as cultural statements – evidence of the reception 
of music. The concept of “poetic musicology” elaborated by Anna Barańczak in the 
1970s, still one of the most valid and important strategies for speaking about music, 
has been updated and revitalised, placed in the space of culture, particularly in the 
area of Polish human sciences, where there is an exceptionally rich and diverse poetic 
output related to music. 
Keywords: comparative literature, intermediality, Polish poetry in 20th century, Adam Zaga-
jewski, Julia Hartwig, musicology, musical analysis, reception of music, transcription of 
music, aculogy
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